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funds separate from the general monies of the homesteader, and
should provide that the husband cannot, at any time, voluntarily dispose of them without the wife's consent. 40 This would ensure that
the wife and creditors would have some protection against the possibility of the husband's squandering the money before the period
of exemption expired. Certainly there is every reason to commend
the practice of exempting the proceeds of voluntary sales, insurance
proceeds, judgments growing out of suits involving the homestead
and involuntary conversions. But the state should always keep in
mind the purpose of the homestead exemption, and make every effort
to guarantee that the law is neither utilized improperly, nor its humanitarian purposes perverted. The interests of the creditors should
be safeguarded, and more importantly, the interests of the homesteadowner's family. It appears that legislative action is the most reliable
way to ensure this, and to provide all parties with a realistic standard
for the treatment and disposition of the proceeds.
GEORGE

E.

BUNNELL

REVOKED BUILDING PERMITS AND EQUITABLE ESTOPPEL
IN FLORIDA
A citizen who takes out a building permit in Florida, even though
scrupulously complying with the regulations of an existing zoning
ordinance, sometimes finds the permit unilaterally revoked in the
wake of the passage of a new zoning ordinance. The rapid increase
in the number of Florida municipalities and the frequent boundary
extensions by communities already incorporated, create a need for
more zoning and more zoning changes, making this problem a common occurrence in many areas. The courts have not been consistent
in determining the rights of the permittee in this situation.
The authority of municipal corporations to pass and enforce
zoning ordinances has been upheld by the highest court of the land.,
This authority is derived from the police power, thus requiring that
the zoning pertain to safeguarding the health, morals, and welfare of

40. This is provided for in other states.
(1957); WASH. REv. STAT. ANN. §549 (1932).
1.

See, e.g., IDAHO CODE ANN. §55-1113

Village of Euclid v. Amber Realty Co., 272 U.S. 365 (1926).
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the community. 2 As urban areas have become larger and more complex the courts have aided the continued extension of local zoning
powers. 3 The trend is decidedly in support of the zoning laws as
against the rights of individual property owners. For example, existing land uses, which traditionally have been considered vested rights,
may now be terminated over a period of time by proper ordinances
and zoning. 4 The Florida Supreme Court has said: "The possession
and enjoyment of all rights and property are subject to the valid
exercise of the police power."5 Consequently, the remedies of the
private landowner against the municipal authorities who administer
the zoning ordinances are few and fragile.
GENERAL RuiLE

The general rule is that a property owner relying on a permit, lawfully and properly issued, is protected to the extent that he expends
money, begins construction, or materially alters his position.6 Such a
permit cannot be revoked except for fraud, misrepresentation or concealment.7 An overwhelming majority of American jurisdictions adhere to this rule and it is endorsed by virtually all text writers.8 The
rule is founded on the familiar doctrine of equitable estoppel. Some
jurisdictions couch this principle in terms of "vested rights," but
the ingredients of the rule are everywhere the same. The Florida
cases with very few exceptions also pose and discuss the problem in
terms of equitable estoppel.
The analytical approach taken here assumes that the city knew the
true facts of the case when the permit was issued and that the permittee is not thereby estopped by his own fault or deceit. Permits
secured by fraud or otherwise illegally issued may be revoked for
obvious reasons. 9
RELIANCE

Ignoring these potential problems the principal issue which the
courts must decide is whether the permittee has relied on the permit
to a sufficient extent to justify estoppel against the city. If there
2. Ibid.
3. 1 YOKLEY, ZONING LAW AND PRACTICE §38 (2d ed. 1953).
4. Standard Oil Co. v. City of Tallahassee, 183 F.2d 410 (5th Cir. 1950); Perkins
v. City of Coral Gables, 57 So. 2d 663 (Fla. 1952).
5. Sharrow v. City of Dania, 83 So. 2d 274, 275 (Fla. 1955).
6. 9 MCQUILLIN, MUNICIPAL CORPORATIONS §26.214 (3d ed. 1950). See Hull v.
Hunt, 53 Wash. 2d 125, 331 P.2d 856 (1958).
7. Ibid.
8. 58 AM. JuR. Zoning §184 (1948).
9. 1 METZENBAUM, ZONING 163 (2d ed. 1955).
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has been no reliance the permit can usually be revoked under the
new zoning.1O In all jurisdictions except Florida, the outcome in revoked permit cases uniformly depends upon the amount of reliance
exerted by the permittee.
In emphasizing the role of reliance, courts outside Florida have
held that expenses incurred in hiring an architect, even before the
permit was issued, constitute sufficient reliance upon old zoning to
support mandamus against the city to issue a permit." The signing of
contracts and incurring of other liabilities frequently is ruled adequate reliance to estop permit revocation. 12 More commonly, the beginning of construction, evidenced by excavations and the pouring
of foundations, has been considered sufficient reliance to justify upholding the permit. 13
In sharp contrast, few cases in Florida turn on the issue of reliance. However, the case of Bregar v. Britton'4 is an exception.
There the plaintiff relied on a zoning change that authorized use of
his property for business. The county revoked the new zoning on
the technical ground that the revision was not accomplished conformably to county-adopted procedures for effecting rezoning. The
fact that the plaintiff had relied to the extent of $28,000 by purchasing theater equipment was apparently the controlling factor in
the supreme court decision holding the county estopped to revoke.
The Florida Supreme Court has also held that the expense of
purchasing property constitutes sufficient reliance when the plaintiff
had specifically inquired of the city about the zoning.1" In Texas
Company v. Town of Miami Springs, the town, after the permit was
issued but before work was begun, passed an ordinance prohibiting
erection of service stations less than 850 feet apart. The permit was
then revoked. The court ruled that the land purchase was sufficient
reliance to estop the city. The primary basis for the ruling, however,
was the pernicious nature of the ordinance involved. The court
considered it an emergency ordinance directed solely at this individual permittee.16
In another Florida decision, atypically predicated on a reliance
rationale, the plaintiff obtained a non-conforming permit to build
a trailer park. After the work had been started the permit was revoked. Because substantial reliance on the permit was shown by
10.

101 C.J.S. Zoning §243 (1958).

11. Nott v. Wolff, 18 Ill. 2d 362, 163 N.E.2d 809 (1960).
12. Sun Oil Co. v. City of Clifton, 16 N.J. Super. 265, 84 A.2d 555 (App.
Div. 1951).
13. State ex rel. A. Hynek & Sons v. Board of Appeals, 267 Wis. 309, 64 N.W.2d
741 (1954).
14. 75 So. 2d 753 (Fla. 1954).
15. Texas Co. v. Town of Miami Springs, 44 So. 2d 808 (Fla. 1950).
16. Id. at 809.
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beginning construction the court estopped the county from revoking
the permit.' 7 In this and the preceding two cases the Florida court
seems to be following the general rule accepted by other jurisdictions.
NOTICE: FLORIDA'S DEPARTURE FROM THE GENERAL RULE

The great majority of permit cases dealt with by the Florida
courts represent a distinct departure from the general rule. Basically,
the deviation is this: If the permittee has notice, actual or constructive, that the zoning may change, or "that the official mind may
change," reliance on the permit or the existing zoning is considered
unjustified and will not support estoppel against the municipality.'8
The following cases exemplify this peculiar phenomenon.
When a proposed new ordinance had been heard on first reading
only, and before its adoption by the city council, reliance on a permit
issued under the existing ordinance was held to be unjustified and
subject to revocation. 9 The reading and publication was considered
sufficient notice of a probable change. The permittee should have
known that his reliance upon the current zoning was unjustified. In
this case the reliance was evidenced by the signing of contracts, the
procurement of building materials, and the beginning of excavation.
The court implied that the permittee used bad faith in acting before
the new zoning was passed. The court did not discuss the owner's
dilemma in having only one zoning ordinance upon which to rely and
yet not being allowed to rely upon it.
In another case illustrating the Florida deviation a corporation had
started to develop a large tract of land relying upon the established
zoning. It had even dedicated streets to public use, which were
accepted by the city. The court said, however, that equitable estoppel
could not be used 'against the application of a new zoning law because
the corporation knew there was public sentiment for change.2 0 In
the same case the court said that an owner has sufficient notice to vitiate any reliance on an existing code if he knows or should know
"that he should not rely on the municipal authorities not to reclassify
'

his property. "

21

In some cases when an owner has been issued a permit and has
commenced to rely upon it to the extent of signing contracts, pouring
foundations, et cetera, a public issue will be made of the matter, frequently evidenced by petitions to the city council. These issues in
17. Kaeslin v. Adams, 97 So. 2d 461 (Fla. 1957).
18. Sharrow v. City of Dania, 83 So. 2d 274 (Fla. 1955); accord, Miami Shores
Village v. Wm.N. Brockway Post, 156 Fla. 673, 24 So. 2d 33 (1945).
19. Sharrow v. City of Dania, 83 So. 2d 274 (Fla. 1955).
20. City of Ft. Lauderdale v. Lauderdale Industrial Sites, Inc., 97 So. 2d 47
(2d D.C.A. Fla. 1957).
21.

Id. at 52.
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turn often become political disputes used by the candidates running
for local office. The court has held that such public expressions and
activities are sufficient notice to the owner that the zoning may be
changed if and when the new officials are elected; thus he is not
justified in relying upon the existing regulations.22 Other jurisdictions
3
have expressly rejected this view.2
A law suit by an adjacent property owner may also be recognized
as constituting adequate notice to negate otherwise sufficient reliance.
In one such case the permittee began construction of a service station
under the authority of a valid building permit. Adjacent property
owners sought an injunction against erection of the station. Subsequently, the city manager revoked the permit and the city commission
ratified this action. The property owners then dismissed their suit,
but the bringing of the action was deemed sufficient notice to prevent
the owner from having the permit reinstated. 24
These cases indicate that the type of notice necessary to negative
reliance upon a permit need not be from an official source, nor need
it be notice of the official mind. Expressions of public sentiment in
the form of petitions, political campaigns, or private suits are sufficient. They are sufficient because they indicate that a change may be
made in the zoning.
This notice concept as applied by Florida courts is strikingly dis2
similar to most states. In the Pennsylvania case of Yocum v. Power 1
the adequacy of notice of this type was squarely before the court.
The plaintiffs had acquired a permit, but before construction was
started a new zoning plan was under consideration by the city council.
The new plan would have disallowed the intended use in the area of
the permit. The argument advanced for revoking the permit was that
the proposed new zoning was notice to the owner of a possible zoning
change. In rejecting this assertion and upholding the validity of the
2
permit the court said: r

"... An unpassed bill in City Council, as one in the State
Legislature, has no more governmental authority than a scribbled note on the back of an envelope in the pocket of a legislator.
"If all business in a City or State, touched upon by pending bills, had to mark time until final action was taken on the
22. Miami Shores Village v. Wn. N. Brockway Post, supra note 18; Sakolsky
v. City of Coral Gables, 139 So. 2d 504 (3d D.C.A. Fla. 1962).
23. Nott v. Wolff, 18 Ill. 2d 362, 163 N.E.2d 809 (1960); Tremarco Corp. v.
Garzio, 32 N.J. 448, 161 A.2d 241 (1960).
24. City of Miami v. State ex rel. Ergene, Inc., 132 So. 2d 474 (3d D.C.A. Fla.
1961).
25. 398 Pa. 223, 157 A.2d 368 (1960).
26. Id. at 226, 157 A.2d at 370.
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contemplated legislation, chaos would grip City and Commonwealth. Nearly every conceivable subject in human affairs can
be found mentioned in the avalanche of bills which descend
upon every session of the Legislature. Nearly every type of
municipal regulation conceivable can be found in the volume
of bills which are introduced in City Council.
".... As nothing can be more unjust in criminal law than an
ex post facto law, so nothing is more frowned on in civil law
than a procedure which has the effect of making illegal what the
law has already recognized as legal. No lover of American
sports would approve of changing ground rules to favor one
side or the other after the game had begun."
THE GOOD FAITH PERMITrEE

Reported Florida cases dealing with permit revocations are also
unique in the emphasis which the decisions attach to the good faith
of the litigants. The elements of good faith are elusive and nowhere
defined in the opinions. It is difficult, therefore, even though sometimes critical, to determine what actions by the permittee will and
what actions will not be considered good faith.
In general, the question seems to hinge on the honest intentions
of the permittee.27 The courts appear to be testing these intentions
by whether the parties were cagey, fast, evasive, or even astute. Some
times a party who asserts a technical legal advantage will be deemed
28
lacking in good faith.
A person who obtains a permit to build on land upon which he
holds only an option may be labeled a bad faith permittee when he
relies upon the permit. 29 The court apparently reasons that an
option holder should not be allowed to obtain the full rights of a
30
fee holder without actually buying the fee.
If a permit is obtained after inducing the authorities to grant a
variance that will authorize the permit,31 or by obtaining a specific
ordinance that changes the zoning,32 bad faith may be attributed to
the owner or to the acting authorities, or both. It is frequently possible to secure a variance or special ordinance authorizing a different
use without the public being fully aware of it. Most people do not
read the legal announcements that publicize these proposals and con27.
28.
29.
30.
31.
32.
v. City

BLACK, LAW DIcTIONARY 822 (4th ed. 1951).

Ibid.
Miami Shores Village v. Win. N. Brockway Post, supra note 18.
Id. at 676, 24 So. 2d at 34.
City of Miami v. State ex rel. Ergene, Inc., supra note 24.
Miami Shores Village v. Wim. N. Brockway Post, supra note 18; Sakolsky
of Coral Gables, supra note 22.
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sequently are unaware of changes until the owner is clearing the land
or beginning construction. It is probably the practical obscurity of
these proceedings that gives rise to suspicions of bad faith. However,
as soon as the matter becomes public knowledge and blooms into a
public issue the court will speak in terms of notice to the plaintiff
as invalidating estoppel, avoiding discussion of bad faith. 33 It is
easier to substantiate notice than bad faith.
A close reading of the cases creates an impression that some degree
of bad faith is attributed to the party who legally and openly proceeds
in the use of his permit when he knows there is open hostility and
strong public sentiment against such use.3 4 The entire concept of
notice to the permittee that the zoning may be changed, or that
the public objects, or that the "official mind may change," seems to
be based more on this bad faith connotation, though it is not so
stated by the courts, than on the expressed reasons that such notice
invalidates any future reliance.
There are legal restraints that hinder the speedy operation of
municipal machinery. A zoning idea cannot be changed into an
ordinance without observing certain waiting periods designed primarily to give notice to the community. When an owner or permittee acts for his own benefit in accordance with proper legal procedure, but before the city can act because of time-consuming procedures, this frequently will be considered bad faith. It will not be
5
called bad faith, but the implications are clear.
If the plaintiff has a permit and delays reliance upon it until
just prior to its revocation or just prior to the new zoning change
and then suddenly exerts reliance as if to firmly establish his right,
this too may be considered bad faith.3 6 Apparently the courts feel that
if the permittee has a bona fide intention of building he will do so
when the permit is issued. Otherwise he may be trying merely to
preserve the right to erect a building in the future if he so desires,
thus in effect having property that is subject to either the old or new
zoning laws.
CONCLUSION

In general, municipal governments in most jurisdictions will be
estopped from revoking a validly issued building permit if the owner
has substantially relied upon it? 7 Florida deviates from this widely
33. Ibid.
34. Miami Shores Village v. Wm. N. Brockway Post, supra note 18; Sakolsky
v. City of Coral Gables, supra note 22; City of Ft. Lauderdale v. Lauderdale Industrial Sites, Inc., supra note 20.
35. Sharrow v. City of Dania, supra note 18.
36. Miami Shores Village v. Win. N. Brockway Post, supra note 18.
37. 9 MCQUILLIN, MUNICIPAL CORPORATIONS §26.214 (3d ed. 1950).
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accepted rule by refusing to apply estoppel against the local government if a permit revocation follows notice that the zoning may be
changed. 38 The principle issues that decide the cases in Florida are:
the amount of reliance demonstrated by the permittee; the type of
notice the permittee had that the zoning might be changed; and
whether the owner demonstrated good or bad faith.
The writer is of the opinion that there is no adequate reason
nor legal basis in support of the notice concept as grounds for denying
estoppel against a city that revokes a permit once it has been relied
upon. None of the Florida cases explain clearly why such notice invalidates reliance upon a legally issued permit. None of the text
writers mention the concept of notice as an exception to the general
rule. No cases have been found in any other jurisdiction that support
this legal mutation. 39 The rationality of this concept is further discredited by the various unofficial ways in which notice may be expressed or communicated. The cases indicate that official notice is
not necessary. It is sufficient if there is strong public sentiment against
the permit, or if it is a political issue, or simply if the permittee has
reason to believe that the official mind may change.
There are many practical difficulties involved in accepting the
results of the Florida rule. For example, what zoning controls the
use of land when the authorities are contemplating a change? Of
what practical value is a permit that has been issued despite the
complaints of adjacent land-owners or despite other public expressions of disapproval? As the cases show, the owner is not justified
in relying on the existing zoning. Yet it is quite clear that he cannot
rely on the zoning that is being contemplated for not only is it without legal efficacy, it may not even be expressly defined. This means
in effect that under these conditions there is no zoning. It means
further, that land owners, developers and builders must wait until
the new zoning is passed if they want to be sure that there is no
possibility of their permits being revoked. This might be an everlasting wait. In some Florida communities zoning is a perennial political issue, constantly being challenged, and regularly changing
40
with the election of new municipal officers.
Municipal zoning should be exercised in a manner that can be
relied upon. Concepts of notice and good faith afford opportunities

38. Sharrow v. City of Dania, supra note 19; Miami Shores Village v. Wm. N.
Brockway Post, supra note 18; Sakolsky v. City of Coral Gables, supra note 22;
City of Miami v. State ex rel. Ergene, Inc., supra note 24; City of Ft. Lauderdale
v. Lauderdale Industrial Sites, Inc., supra note 20.
39. But see A.J. Aberman, Inc. v. New Kensington, 377 Pa. 520, 105 A.2d 586
(1954).
40. Town of Indialantic, Florida. Three changes in two years.
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for doctrinal manipulations that undermine this objective of all laws.
As was pointed out in the Yocum case, "If all business in a City or
State, touched upon by pending bills, had to mark time until final
action was taken on the contemplated legislation, chaos would grip
City and Commonwealth."i1 If zoning ordinances stipulated that
all permits issued under them were subject to revocation upon notice
to the permittee of a possible change, or if the permit itself carried
that reservation, then such notice would be reasonable grounds for
revoking the permit. In none of the cited Florida cases did the cities
point to the ordinance or to the permit as having been issued with
this reservation. Such a reservation, if used, should provide for official
notice to the permittee and not unofficial notice communicated by
law suits, political speeches, or petitions of disgruntled citizens.
The State of Washington has adopted a rule that goes beyond the
general rule in protecting the permittee or owner against possible
revocations.42 Its most commendable feature is specificity as to the
rights of the permittee as of a date certain. The troublesome issues
of reliance, notice, and good faith play no role in determining the
rights of the parties. The rule consequently diminishes litigation in
the zoning area. After quoting the general rule the Washington court
43
said in Hull v. Hunt:

"Notwithstanding the weight of authority, we prefer to have
a date certain upon which the right vests to construct in accordance with the building permit. We prefer not to adopt a
rule which forces the court to search through . . . 'the moves
and countermoves of . . . parties . . . by way of passing ordi-

nance and bringing actions for injunctions'- to which may be
added the stalling or acceleration of administrative action in
in the issuance of permits - to find that date upon which the
substantial change of position is made which finally vests the
right. The more practical rule to administer, we feel, is that
the right vests when the party, property owner or not, applies
for his building permit, if that permit is thereafter issued."
The writer believes Florida would be well advised to adopt the
general rule with its emphasis on substantial reliance, and to discard
the notice concept and good faith considerations. The interests of all
parties would be even better protected if Florida went beyond the
general rule and adopted the Washington position outlined above.
PALMER W.

COLLINS

41. 398 Pa. 223, 226, 157 A.2d 368, 370 (1960).
42. Hull v. Hunt, supra note 6; State ex rel. Ogden v. City of Bellevue, 45
Wash. 2d 492, 275 P.2d 899 (1954).
43. 53 Wash, 2d 125, 130, 331 P.2d 856, 859 (1958).
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